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Trianon: a blessing for some, 
a curse for others
The most important historical conflict in the rela-
tionship between Romania and Hungary focuses on 
issues related to Transylvania (Romanian Ardeal or 
Transilvania, Hungarian Erdély). This region, which 
has traditionally been inhabited by both Hungar-
ians and Romanians, is of great importance for 
the culture and identity of both nations. For the 
vast majority of the last millennium, these areas 
belonged to the Kingdom of Hungary, but in the 
nineteenth century it was there, under conditions 
of increasing Magyarisation, where the grassroots 
Romanian national movement developed rapidly. 
Its activists demanded political and linguistic rights 
for the fast-expanding Romanian population. After 
the defeat of the Central Powers in World War I and 
the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918, Romania 
incorporated Transylvania, which then was al-
ready inhabited by a mostly Romanian population.1 
1 According to the last available census conducted before 
the annexation of Transylvania to Romania (dating from 
1910), this region was inhabited by 54% Romanians and 
31.6% Hungarians.
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On 3 November, the Romanian parliament declared that 4 June would be a new public holiday com-
memorating the signing of the Treaty of Trianon on that day in 1920. This document formalised the 
transfer of large territories then belonging to the Hungarian part of Austria-Hungary to the neighbour-
ing countries, including Romania. These lands today constitute over 40% of Romania’s land area. Over 
the past two years, preparations for the 100th anniversary of the treaty’s adoption have exacerbated 
the relationship between Romania and Hungary, which perceives this event as a national tragedy. 
The two states’ widely divergent perceptions of the treaty, and the presence in Romania of a large 
and politically active Hungarian minority as its result, are a constant source of tensions between the 
two countries. The Hungarian problem, symbolised by the aforementioned document, resonates 
throughout society, and has traditionally been exploited as an instrument of political struggle by rep-
resentatives of the main Romanian political groups. Budapest has also been willing to exploit the 
‘Trianon complex’ in the Hungarian mentality for its domestic political aims. However, Hungarian politics 
does not constitute a real threat to the stability of Romania in the current international environment. 
The geographic location of both countries obliges them to cooperate, especially in the fields of 
economy and energy, which mitigates their historical and symbolic disputes.
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This fact was confirmed in the Treaty of Versailles, 
and the final form of the new borders was rec-
ognised internationally at the Palace of Trianon 
near Paris on 4 June 1920. Under that treaty, 
Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its territory, 
including Transylvania, which is still seen today 
as an unfair partition of the state. This narrative 
has been promoted by Fidesz and the govern-
ment of Viktor Orbán in particular; after coming 
to power in 2010 – by striving for support from 
the right-wing electorate, among other things – he 
increased the emphasis on cultivating the memory 
of Trianon and the idea of the unity of the nation 
beyond the borders of the state.2 As early as the 
first sitting of the government in 2010, 4 June 
was established as National Unity Day (Hungarian 
Nemzeti összetartozás napja) to commemorate 
the signing of the treaty.
Meanwhile, for the Romanian people, the annexa-
tion of Transylvania is the most significant event 
in the country’s modern history, and symbolically 
completed the process that had been ongoing 
since the 19th century of consolidating the ter-
ritories inhabited by the Romanian population. 
However, Great Union Day (Romanian Ziua Marii 
Uniri) has traditionally been celebrated on 1 De-
cember because it was on that day in 1918 that the 
National Assembly of Romanians in Transylvania 
and Hungary passed a resolution in the city of 
Alba Iulia to annex the region. This date marks 
the beginning of a kind of Romanian ‘golden age’ 
(1918–1940) and the birth of ‘Greater Romania’.3 
The Trianon agreement, although clearly viewed 
positively, is less important from the Romani-
an perspective than the Alba Iulia resolution, 
which legitimises their claims to Transylvania. 
2 A. Sadecki, The long shadow of Trianon, OSW, Warsaw 
2020, www.osw.waw.pl.
3 The term ‘Greater Romania’ refers both to the Romanian 
state within its boundaries of the interwar period and the 
political idea that the Romanian state should include all 
territories inhabited by Romanians, that is – apart from 
the lands currently belonging to this country – inter alia 
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.
Nevertheless, Bucharest is very sensitive about 
any manifestations of Hungarian resentment to-
wards Transylvania or any attempts to undermine 
Trianon, and considers them to be symptoms of 
revisionism. When in 2019 the Hungarian parlia-
ment announced that the next year would be the 
‘year of national cohesion’, in connection with 
the hundredth anniversary of the signing of the 
‘peace dictate’, Romania’s foreign ministry said 
that any attempts to rewrite history were unac-
ceptable and that “the Treaty of Trianon, which 
establishes... the border between Romania and 
Hungary, is not a problem which needs to be 
resolved”. Almost two-thirds of Romanians also 
believe that Budapest would like to regain control 
of Transylvania ‘one way or another’.4
Fighting for the favour 
of the Hungarian minority
One consequence of the post-World War I border 
changes is the presence in modern Romania of 
a significant Hungarian minority, numbering about 
1.2 million people according to the 2011 census 
(i.e. 6–7% of the Romanian population, and about 
18% of Transylvania’s population), who mainly live 
in the so-called Szeklerland (also Székely Land; 
Hungarian Székelyföld, Romanian Ținutul Secuiesc 
or Secuimea), that is, south-eastern Transylva-
nia (the Harghita, Covasna, and Mureș counties). 
Romania’s Hungarians are well organised and are 
represented in three political groups, of which 
the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania 
(UDMR) plays a key role. This party was founded 
in 1989, and has been present in the Romanian 
parliament since the very beginning. Traditionally 
this party has been supported by almost the entire 
Hungarian minority, and at present has around 
20 to 30 deputies (out of the c. 314–345 seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies) and around 10 senators 
(out of 136–140 seats in the Senate).5
4 V. Lupu, ‘INSCOP Survey: Most Romanians Say Corruption, 
Russia Are Main Threats’, Romania Journal, 20 May 2019, 
www.romaniajournal.ro.
5 The number of deputies sitting in the Chamber of Depu-
ties and senators in the Senate is inconsistent due to the 
specificity of the electoral law.
During Fidesz’s time in office, Buda-
pest has stepped up its support for 
the diaspora, perceiving this as the 
state meeting its moral obligation.
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Current legislation in Romania gives the minorities 
a wide range of rights, which the UDMR takes 
great care to exploit as it tries to wield the great-
est possible influence on Bucharest’s policies. 
Formally a centre-right group, since 1996 it has 
often participated in the country’s ruling coalitions 
(regardless of their ideological affiliation), or has 
offered ad hoc support for successive governments 
in exchange for having its demands met. The 
UDMR was a formal coalition partner for 13–14 
years, and for the next 7–8 years it cooperated 
with or supported the governments (including 
minority administrations). In 2018 alone, the group 
received a state subsidy of around €5.5 million. 
The Hungarian minority has extensive support for 
its culture and language at all levels of education 
(in minority schools all subjects, except grammar 
and Romanian literature, can be taught in their 
own language). In villages inhabited by at least 
20% minority representatives, the government 
is obliged to offer them access to administrative 
services in their language. Bilingual signs and 
noticeboards are also erected in these areas.
Despite what is formally favourable legislation 
for the minorities, representatives of the Hun-
garian population regularly complain that their 
rights are not always fully respected. Since Fidesz 
came to power, Budapest has paid particular 
attention to these voices, and casts itself in the 
role of the defender of Romanian Hungarians’ 
interests, which has contributed to this group’s 
growing assertiveness towards Bucharest. During 
Fidesz’s time in office, Budapest has stepped up 
its support for the diaspora, perceiving this as the 
state meeting its moral obligation towards those 
Hungarians who found themselves living abroad 
as a consequence of the Treaty of Trianon. In May 
2010, the Orbán government decided to grant 
ethnic Hungarians living abroad the right to dual 
citizenship (and therefore also to participate in 
elections in Hungary); at least half the Hungar-
ians living in Romania have taken up this option. 
Fidesz politicians seek to mobilise the Hungarian 
minority in Romania during election campaigns 
to the Hungarian parliament (often in cooperation 
with the UDMR), and they regularly visit Romanian 
Hungarians; this includes participation in the an-
nual Bálványos Free Summer University organised 
in Băile Tușnad (Hungarian Tusnádfürdő). One vivid 
example of this mobilisation was Prime Minister 
Orbán’s call in 2018 to Hungarians living outside 
their homeland to support his party in the up-
coming vote.
Growing tensions around the demand 
for autonomy
The vast majority of Romanians regard the Hun-
garian support for its diaspora with great distrust, 
considering it as open interference in their internal 
affairs and an instrument of political corruption. 
They find most offensive the financial support 
which Budapest offers to companies, media and 
organisations of the Hungarian minority in Romania. 
In 2017–18 approximately €300 million from the 
Hungarian state budget went into Transylvania in 
this way.6 This money mainly goes to Hungarian 
media and foundations, and is also used to build 
and renovate sports facilities, schools, kindergar-
tens and churches. Additional resources go to areas 
inhabited by the Hungarian minority in Romania as 
part of cultural programmes (mainly the renovation 
of buildings and monuments which are important 
for Hungarian culture). According to the findings 
of Romanian investigative journalists, in recent 
years Budapest – with the aid of state finances 
and the Fidesz-supported Association for Media 
Space in Transylvania (Hungarian Erdélyi Médiatér 
Egyesület) – has de facto subordinated or taken 
over the region’s key Hungarian-language media 
(including press, radio and TV stations and websites, 
with the popular Székelyhon service at the head).7 
The Hungarian government’s actions are all the more 
visible and effective as the counties that make up the 
Szeklerland region (mainly Harghita and Covasna) 
6 A. Keller-Alant, ‘Living like in Hungary: Orban bankrolling 
romania ‘ethnic parallelism’’, Balkan Insight, 30 January 
2020, www.balkaninsight.com.
7 B. Felseghi, ‘Presa în limba maghiară din Transilvania este 
preluată de FIDESZ’, Press One, 8 July 2019, www.pressone.ro.
Romania’s Hungarians are well or-
ganised and are represented in three 
political groups, of which the UDMR 
plays a key role.
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are among the poorest in the country. In 2017, 
GDP per capita in these two regions amounted 
to c. €19,500, which is 70% of the national average 
and just 44% of the EU average.
Romania fears that Budapest’s activity towards the 
Hungarian minority is undermining this popula-
tion’s loyalty and negatively affecting its integra-
tion with its country of residence. This anxiety 
redoubled after the annexation of Crimea and the 
outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014. 
The picture is made even more complex by the 
different approaches of the Romanians and Hun-
garians towards Russia: Romania views Orbán’s 
rapprochement with Moscow with great distrust 
and sees Russia as a key threat to its security and 
its main rival in the Republic of Moldova, which 
is a priority of Romanian foreign policy.8
Although most of Budapest’s activities for the 
Hungarian minority in Romania have been toler-
ated, there are exceptions to this rule; one exam-
ple was the idea revealed in 2018 for Hungary 
to make c. €77 million available for development 
projects in the Szeklerland. Even though formally 
this programme was not addressed to Romanian 
Hungarians alone, the grant applications had 
to be made in the Hungarian language, which 
met with indignation from Bucharest. A year af-
ter the initiative was announced, Romania made 
an official protest at Hungary’s actions, pointing 
out that they were being carried out without its 
consent. Fears of a rise in Hungarian influence in 
the region mean that Bucharest is clearly reluctant 
to implement any investments connected with 
improving the communication routes between 
Transylvania and Hungary (such as the Via Car-
patia). Considering the unsatisfactory quality of 
the road infrastructure linking the region with 
Bucharest, and that Budapest has been strength-
8 K. Całus, In the shadow of history. Romanian-Moldovan 
relations, OSW, Warsaw 2015, www.osw.waw.pl.
ening its influence in the areas dominated by the 
Hungarian minority, Romania is above all trying 
to integrate this area with the rest of the country 
in terms of communication; only then will it at-
tempt to implement ideas for modernising the 
routes running towards Hungary.
The government in Bucharest has met the de-
mands to create a Hungarian autonomous region 
on Romanian territory with a particularly nega-
tive reaction. This demand has been consistently 
made by the UDMR in particular, with the sup-
port of the Orbán government.9 The slogan of 
autonomy is raised at the numerous demonstra-
tions and marches held every year on 10 March, 
the so-called Szekler Freedom Day, and these 
events often involve a significant number of the 
minority (for example, several tens of thousands 
of people participated in the Great Szekler March 
for Autonomy in 2013: according to the organis-
ers, perhaps over 100,000 people). On 8 January 
2018, the UDMR and the other diaspora parties 
signed a joint declaration calling on Bucharest 
to establish a Hungarian autonomous region in 
the Szekler region, which the Romanian govern-
ment strongly criticised. The then Prime Minister 
Mihai Tudose stated at the time that whoever 
hung the Szekler flag on a public building (in 
a minority-inhabited territory), “will also wave 
next to the flag”.10
Romania consistently takes the position that, de-
spite lacking formal autonomy, Hungarians have 
dominated the governments of the communes 
and localities in the areas they inhabit since 1990. 
At the same time, they emphasise that the pos-
sibility of creating an independent Hungarian 
region is blocked by Romania’s Basic Law. In 2017, 
the Legislative Council (the parliament’s advisory 
body), referring to the demand for the establish-
ment of a Szekler Autonomy, explicitly stated that 
the constitution defines Romania as a “national, 
9 Such an autonomous region would have legal personality, 
legislative and executive bodies (including a president), 
and Hungarian would have the status of official language 
within its territory.
10 It is worth noting that in 2014, the Szekler flag replaced 
the European Union flag which had previously hung on 
the Hungarian Parliament building in Budapest.
The government in Bucharest has met 
the demands to create a Hungarian 
autonomous region on Romanian 
territory with a particularly negative 
reaction.
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sovereign, independent, unitary and indivisible 
state”; creating a separate unit in parallel to the 
existing unified administrative structures is there-
fore impossible.
The Hungarian bogeyman
The idea of establishing a public holiday com-
memorating the signing of the Treaty of Trianon 
is part of the Romanian elite’s frequent habit of 
using socially resonant topics concerning Hungary 
to distract the electorate from current problems. 
For example, in June 2019 the ruling Social Demo-
crats (PSD), who were then facing a political crisis 
after their president had been sentenced to impris-
onment for corruption, decided to use the Trianon 
issue to present itself as a party that cares about 
the national interest and opposes any attempts 
to ‘rewrite history’.11 When riots broke out be-
tween Hungarians and Romanians in the military 
cemetery in the village of Valea Uzului (Hungarian 
Úzvölgye), where soldiers of both nationalities 
who had fought in World War I are buried, the 
PSD immediately submitted a bill establishing 
the anniversary of Trianon as a national holiday.
Another example of this instrumental exploitation 
of historical issues was the situation which began 
in April 2020. The UDMR submitted a bill to create 
a Szekler Autonomy in December 2019; as usual, 
it was delayed by four months. But then, through 
an oversight, it was referred for further work in 
the Senate, as a result of the tacit consent of the 
Chamber of Deputies. Marcel Ciolac, the head of the 
chamber and a leader of the PSD, failed to include 
it on the agenda for a further 45 days after the bill 
was submitted. This time, President Klaus Iohannis 
decided to take advantage of Ciolac’s
11 K. Całus, ‘Rumunia: lider obozu rządzącego w więzieniu’ 
[Romania: the governing camp’s leader in prison], OSW, 
29 May 2019, www.osw.waw.pl
error to present his party before the upcoming 
elections as endangering Romania’s vital interests, 
and he publicly accused the PSD of trying to give 
Transylvania to Hungary. The president’s statement 
sparked a harsh reaction from Budapest; Hungar-
ian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó called Iohannis’ 
words “uncivilised” and “an incitement to hatred”.
It’s not just Trianon that matters
In the current international conditions, Hungary’s 
policy – both towards minorities and its historical- 
-symbolic policy – does not, as mentioned above, 
pose any real threat to the stability of Romania. 
Despite the tensions that have arisen over the 
approaching 100th anniversary of Trianon (espe-
cially over the last two years), neither country is 
interested in escalating its historical and identity 
disputes to other areas. This is evidenced by the 
attempts Bucharest and Budapest have made to 
diffuse the strong emotions related to this event. 
For example, on 26 May this year, just ten days 
before the anniversary, both countries’ foreign 
ministers organised a meeting during which they 
adopted a conciliatory tone in reference to their 
nations’ different attitudes towards Trianon, and 
agreed to start a dialogue on a development 
programme for Transylvania, which had hitherto 
been criticised by Romania.
Bucharest and Budapest are important economic 
partners for each other. In 2019, Hungary was the 
fourth largest recipient (after Germany, Italy and 
France) of Romanian goods and services (4.8% of 
the total) and the third biggest exporter onto the 
Romanian market (7% of the total).12 In 2018, over 
5% of total Hungarian exports went to Romania, 
which put this country in fourth place after Ger-
many, Slovakia and Italy. The value of Hungarian 
investments in Romania exceeded €1.2 billion 
(14th place) in 2018. Tourism is also growing: Hun-
garians are currently the sixth largest group of 
tourists visiting Romania.
12 ‘Rezultatele Comerţului Internaţional al României în 
perioada 01.01–31.12.2019’, Buletin informativ lunar, 
No. 12/2019, March 2020, www.imm.gov.ro.
Hungarian-Romanian ties are set to 
expand further in the near future. The 
prospects for developing energy infra-
structure look particularly favourable.
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Hungarian-Romanian ties are set to expand further 
in the near future. The prospects for developing 
energy infrastructure look particularly favourable: 
this year, the construction of the first stage of the 
BRUA transit gas pipeline connecting Bulgaria, 
Romania, Hungary and Austria was completed;13 
this will allow gas supplies from the Caspian Sea 
and the Romanian Black Sea shelf. 
13 K. Całus, A. Łoskot-Strachota, ‘BRUA i rumuńskie pomysły 
na środkowoeuropejski rynek gazu’ [BRUA and Romanian 
ideas for the Central European gas market], Komentarze 
OSW, nr 365, 24 November 2020, www.osw.waw.pl.
Both countries also share common interests within 
the EU. Hungary supports Romania’s entry into the 
Schengen area, and together they favour the com-
munity’s rapid expansion to include the Western 
Balkan states. Both countries are also gradually 
developing regional and sectoral cooperation, 
including the EU’s strategy for the Danube region. 
They are also united by their similar positions on 
the negotiations concerning the EU’s multiannual 
financial framework.
Map. The borders of the Kingdom of Hungary before World War I overlaid on a contemporary 






















Borders of the Kingdom of Hungary before World War I
Majority-Hungarian regions in central Europe
Sources: B. Nagy, Az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia felosztása, www.1914-1918.btk.mta.hu; national 
censuses of 2001 (Ukraine) and 2011 (Romania, Serbia, Slovakia).
